RECENT CASES
RIGHT OF SHAREHOLDERS TO "MODIFY" PLAN OF
REORGANIZATION AFTER CONFIRMATION
The Equitable Office Building Corporation filed in 194i a petition for reorganization under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act., In May 1945, the trustee
submitted a plan for reorganization which was approved by the district court
in December 1945. Under this plan the debtor's property would be transferred
to a new corporation; the first mortgage of $i6,ooo,ooo on the debtor's principal
asset, the forty-story Equitable Office Building in New York City, would remain undisturbed; the second mortgage, previously reduced to $3,ooo by refunding with 5 per cent debentures, would be paid in cash; and the holders of
the debentures, for their claim of nearly $6,ooo,ooo of prinacipal and accrued interest, would receive 475,400 new shares and income bonds, convertible into
shares, with a face value of $2,852,4oo. The stockholders would receive 86,2o9.8

new shares-one new share for ten old shares. This plan was confirmed by the
court on May 13, 1946, after being accepted by creditors and stockholders.
On July 8, 1946, the court ordered consummation of the plan, but before any
transfers of property or securities had taken place pursuant to the confirmed
plan, two stockholders filed a petition setting forth a new proposal. The old
stockholders would be given one new share for ten old shares, as under the confirmed plan, and an option to buy one new share for each old share at $6. An
underwriter would purchase, under a firm offer, those shares not taken by stockholders. The proceeds of the new stock issue of 1,017,984 shares, plus $769,912
of the debtor's cash balance of about $9oo,ooo, would be used to pay off the
second mortgagees and the debenture-holders in full. The first mortgage would
not be affected. This proposal would produce a capital structure identical to
that which would be reached under the confirmed plan if the holders of the proposed income bonds chose to convert to stock. The ownership of most of the
equity, however, would be in the hands of the old stockholders who exercised
their options, or in those persons who purchased from the underwriter, instead
of being transferred to the old debenture-holders.
The petition containing this proposal was denied by the district court. A stay
of the proceedings was granted by Mr. Justice Reed of the Supreme Court pending the taking of an appeal.2 On appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
' 52 Stat. 883 (1938), i U.S.C.A. § 5oi (1946).
2In re Equitable Office Bldg. Corp., C. C. H. Bkcy. L. Serv. 58370 (1946). In his opinion
Mr. Justice Reed stated clearly some of the issues to be resolved in this case: "When no fraud
or other unfair practices or acts are charged to the beneficiaries of the confirmation, as is the
situation in these proceedings, rights acquired by confirmation of a plan may be secured from
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Second Circuit, the order denying leave to file the petition was reversed. The
court maintained that changes in a reorganization plan after confirmation were
permissible if they were "to some extent congruent with the plan" and that expiration of the underwriter's offer did not render the case moot. Although the
proposal would cut sharply into the debtor's cash assets, the stockholders, and
not the court or debenture-holders, must consider that problem in passing upon
the proposal. The confirmation order had given the debenture-holders, who opposed the petition, no "legally protected interest in the property beyond the
principal and interest of their bonds." Knight v. Wertheim & Co.3
The first issue raised by this decision is how late in a Chapter X reorganization proceeding the old stockholders may be heard upon proposals to pay off
senior interests and put themselves in a position to regain control of the debtor
corporation. This question is basic, inasmuch as the financial difficulties leading
to institution of reorganization proceedings frequently are precipitated or aggravated by the sharp deflation which has come to be termed the downswing fluctuation in the business cycle. Since in the cyclical pattern deflation generally is
followed by a rise in property values, it is to the interest of equity holders to
postpone as long as possible the date upon which new rights created in a proceeding become final. In such delay will often lie their best hope of taking advantage of reflation or inflation to retain or regain control and ownership of
debtor corporations.
This decision stands for the proposition that the cut-off point at which old
rights are terminated is or may be at some stage after confirmation of a reoiganization plan. In reaching that result the court noted that no transfers of property
or securities pursuant to the confirmed plan had taken place. Therefore the actual taking of steps in consummation may be the limiting factor. While there
is no precise stopping-point in Chapter X procedure between confirmation and
final decree, courts may be reluctant to upset confirmed reorganization plans
where a substantial amount of the paper work involved in executing the plans
has been accomplished.4 It may be necessary for reorganization courts to balchange, unless gross injustice is shown ..... It may be determined that present debenture
holders carry the risk of profit or loss after confirmation and are therefore entitled to any increased value. Or, in view of Chap. X § 222, the stockholders' right to redeem the property before consummation without regard to possible advantages or disadvantages from such action
may be the dominant factor ..... It may become necessary to decide whether the new proposals are a modification of the old plan, a new plan or an effort to dismiss the proceedings.
.... I do not think that the present debenture holders' objection to the early termination of
the underwriting proposal is sound. It is the debenture holders' objection to accepting payment of their debts in full that delays prompt cash payment ..... !
3 158 F. 2d 838 (C.C.A. 2d, 1946), cert. den. sub nom. McGuire v. Equitable Office Building
Corp., 67 S. Ct. 1308 (,947).
4 Changes after consummation were not permitted in Reese v. Beacon Hotel Corp., 149 F.
2d 6io (C.C.A. 2d, 1945); North American Car Corp. v. Peerless Weighing & Vending Machine
Corp., 143 F. 2d 938 (C.C.A. 2d, 1944); Diversey Bldg. Corp. v. Metropolitan Trust Co., 141
F. 2d 65 (C.C.A. 7th, 1944); In re Wedgewood Hotel Co., 125 F. 2d 489 (C.C.A. 7th, 1942);

Mohonk Realty Co. v. Wise Shoe Stores, Inc., iii F. 2d 287 (C.C.A. 2d, x94o).
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ance the -inconvenience of retracing and undoing, the paper work against the
hardship to-shareholders arising from denying them the advantage of improved
circumstances. The language of the decision in the present case indicates that
both considerations probably will be taken into account.
In permitting consideration of the new proposal after confirmation in this
case the court relied in part on Section 222 of Chapter X,s which authorizes alteration or modification of a plan before or after confirmation 6 with the approval
of the reorganization judge. This section does not in terms distinguish between
modifications which result in payment in full of senior interests and those
which result in altering creditors' rights. It is doubtful, however, whether the
decision should be viewed as controlling where the proposed modification is of
the latter kind. In giving a broad interpretation of Section 222 the court obviously was influenced by the fact that the proposed alteration would at the same
time yield senior interests (the debenture-holders) payment in full and permit
the shareholders to protect their interests. Courts may be less disposed to disturb a confirmed plan where the tendered amendment would require the senior
interests to remain in the debtor corporation with rights differing both from
those they originally possessed and from those granted, them under the confirmed plan.
Some light as to the intended operation of Section 222 is found in legislative
records. The report of the House Committee on the Judiciary on subsection (f)
of former Section 77 B, from which Section 222 is derived, states that "It is ads Bankruptcy Act § 222, 52 Stat. 898 (1938), YIU.S.C.A. § 622 (1946): "A plan may be altered or modified, with the approval of the judge, after its submission for acceptance and before or after its confirmation if, in the opinion of the judge, the alteration or modification does
not materially and adversely affect the interests of creditors or stockholders. If the judge finds
that the proposed alteration or modification, filed with his approval, does materially and adversely affect the interests of creditors or stockholders, he shall fix a hearing for the consideration, and a subsequent time for the acceptance or rejection, of such alteration or modification.
The requirements in regard to notice of hearing, to submission to the Securities and Exchange
Commission, to acceptance, to filing and hearing of objections to confirmation and to the confirmation, as prescribed in article VII of this chapter in regard to the plan proposed to be altered
or modified, shall be complied with."
6Confirmation occurs late in the sequence of events in a reorganization. In a Chapter X
proceeding, once the petition for reorganization has been approved by the court, a plan is proposed by the trustee or by creditors (§ 16q), or, if the corporation is not insolvent, by stockholders (§ 170). Any plan found by the court to be worthy of consideration must then be submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission for examination if the scheduled debt exceeds $3,ooo,ooo; if the debt is less, such submission is optional to the court (§ x72). After a report by the Securities and Exchange Commission and hearings upon the plan, the court approves it if it is found that the plan meets the requirements of the act (§ 174). The approved
plan must be submitted to and be accepted by two-thirds of the number voting in each class
of creditors affected by it, and by a majority of the stockholders voting, if the debtor is solvent
(§ 179). Upon such submission and acceptance, the court confirms the plan if it complies with
the act (§ 221). After confirmation the court directs consummation of the plan (§ 227). When
the plan has been consummated, a final decree is entered -which discharges the debtor and
terminates all rights and liabilities except as provided in the plan (§ 228). Procedure under
former Section 77B was similar except that plans were not submitted to the Securities andoExchange Commission.
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visable that the bill permit modifications and changes" in plans after confirmation because "amendments are sometimes requisite, not only to obtain the required number of consents, but also ....to provide for matters not foreseen, to
correct errors, mistakes, omissions ..... "7 This history furnished additional
support to the result reached by the court in the present case. The sudden rise
in real estate values after the end of the war, without which the new proposal
probably could not have been made, may well have been a "matter not foreseen" when the trustee's plan, that ultimately confirmed, was offered in May
1945. It would also follow, however, that the sudden rise would be a matter not
foreseen even in the context of a proposal to change the rights of creditors rather
than to pay them off in full.
In opening the way for a modification after confirmation, the present decision is not inconsistent with cases which have refused to permit changes in
plans on the basis of increased earnings experienced in late stages of reorganization proceedings. In several railroad reorganizations under Section 77 of the
Bankruptcy Act, junior interests attempted to procure alteration of plans to
reflect the increase in earnings accompanying the recent war effort. 8 The plans
attacked provided for compensating senior interest in part with stock for the
superior rights which they were to give up. The junior interests seeking modification proposed that the capital structures of the reorganized corporations
be enlarged in view of the increased earnings. In resisting these efforts to disturb the plans, the courts pointed to the fact that the possibility of increased
earnings had been considered in formulating the plans under attack, and ruled
that, under the absolute priority rule,9 the senior interests must be fully compensated for loss of their liens by receiving the share of such increased earnings
which has thus been allotted them. To have expanded the capital structure
would have diluted the new interest of the holders of the old senior securities,
thereby denying them the full compensation to which they were entitled under
the absolute priority rule. Moreover, expansion of the over-all capitalizations
of the debtor corporations on the basis of war earnings, which were extraordi7Report

6

of the House Committee on the Judiciary on H.R. 5884, 73d Cong. ist Sess., at

(1934).

8 RFC v. Denver & R. G. W. R. Co., 328 U.S. 495 (z946); Group of Institutional Investors
v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. Co., 318 U.S. 523 (1942); Ecker v. Western Pacific R. Corp.,
318 U.S. 448 (1942).

9To be fair and equitable, a reorganization plan must provide a valuation of the debtor's
assets on the basis of prospective earnings. Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. Du Bois, 312
U.S. 510 (1941). The plan must afford creditors absolute priority in the debtor's assets over
stockholders. Kansas City Terminal Ry. Co. v. Central Union Trust Co., 271 U.S. 445 (1926).
If the debtor is insolvent, stockholders must be excluded from participation unless they make a
contribution to the new corporation in money or money'sworth. Case v. Los Angeles Lumber
Products Co., Ltd., 3o8 U.S. io6 (i939). Bondholders may be given inferior grades of securities,
or even securities of the same grade as are received by junior interests, but their superior rights
must be recognized. Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U.S. 510 (1941). Creditors

are entitled to the full value of their property, whether in dividends or in control. Northern
Pacific Ry. Co. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482 (1913).
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narily high and seemed unlikely to continue, would have tended to produce unsound capital structures in the reorganized corporations.
I Neither of these factors existed in the instant case. If the
proposed modification were effected, the old senior interests would be paid in full or left undisturbed, so that the requirement of absolute priority would be met. The capital
structure would be simplified rather than rendered more complex. The increased
value of the property would have inured to the benefit of the debenture-holders,
since that increase attracted the underwriting offer which made it possible to
pay them off in full. In view of these considerations, it may be concluded that
the result reached by the court has no bearing upon the rule established in the
railroad cases.
The, second major issue involved in this decision concerns the duty and responsibility of the reorganization court to pass upon the feasibility"' of a proposal, made after confirmation of a reorganization plan, to pay off creditors in
full and make possible the return of the debtor corporation to the old shareholders. Section 222 provides that a plan may be modified before or after confirmation, with the approval of the judge. Section i74"1 of Chapter X requires
that before the judge approves a plan, he must find that it is "feasible." Subsection 216 (i) states that a scheme, to be a Chapter X plan of reorganization,
"shall include in respect to creditors generally, or some class of them ....
provisions altering or modifying their rights, either through the issuance of new securities of any character or otherwise." Inasmuch as the proposal in this case
did not affect the first mortgage, and provided for payment in full of the debentures, which were subject to call, it did not come within the definition of a
reorganization plan under Chapter X. It is for this reason that doubt existed
as to whether it was necessary that the court pass upon the feasibility of the
new proposal.
The issue was presented to the court in this case in connection with the adequacy of the working capital which would be left the corporation if the proposal
were put into effect. Implementation of the proposal called for the use of $769,912 of the debtor's cash on hand to make up the sum needed to pay off the debenture-holders. The debtor would then be left with only $170,000 in cash.
The debenture-holders and the trustee of the debtor"2 urged that this balance
10"Feasibility means that the reorganized company will emerge in a solvent condition with
reasonable prospects of financial stability and success. Some of the factors to be considered in
this determination involve the soundness of the proposed capital structure and the ability of
the reorganized company to meet its financial obligations at their maturity dates." In re Barlum Realty Co., 62 F. Supp. 8X, 87 (Mich., 1945).
11Section 174 provides that after hearing and Securities and Exchange Commission Report
upon a plan, the judge "shall enter an order approving the plan or plans .... which are fair
and equitable, and feasible .......

Upon consummation of the confirmed plan, the trustee, J. Donald Duncan, would have
been one of the directors of the new corporation, along with Howard S. Cullman, Harry R.
Amott, Charles H. Dana, Jeffrey S. Granger, Edwin I. Hillson, and John C. Traphagen. 163
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would be dangerously small, inasmuch as the first mortagee, the Equitable
Life Assurance Society, had refused to agree to reduce interest and amortization, which amounted to about $i,ooo,ooo annually. However, the court ruled
that the fact that "the prospect was undoubtedly of a much smaller margin
[of cash] than had been the company's habit in the past" was not a consideration for the debenture-holders, trustee, or judge, but that "it was for a majority
"and that "Chapter X does not
of the shareholders, and for them alone ....
give to the bankruptcy court any larger supervision in such a situation than if
'
the new corporation had been set up and sent upon its way."' 3
Taken literally, this statement of the court, and its implied holding that the
district court abused its discretion in declining to permit adoption of the proposal by the stockholders, lead to the conclusion that bankruptcy courts have
no discretion to refuse to permit such proposals to be passed upon by shareholders. This result probably would not lead to undesirable consequences in the
present case. Although the debtor corporation's cash balances would be relatively small if the proposal were adopted, the prospects of comparatively profitable operations were good. In the past the property had been operated at a profit
at all times except during the later years of the depression. The existing shortage of office space and housing accommodations in New York City presaged a
rapid improvement in the cash position of the corporation. Moreover, the record
did not contain evidence that the financial difficulties of the debtor resulted from
mismanagement by the officers ultimately controlled by the shareholders.
There is no reason to assume, however, that in future cases an absence of discretion on the part of the reorganization court to pass upon the feasibility of an
arrangement to return a corporation in reorganization to its shareholders will
be without undesirable implications. Where the arrangement contemplates an
unsound capital structure as a result of new financing, or a return of the corporation to the control of a group which mismanaged it in the past, the enterprise may be headed for another reorganization proceeding within a short time.
Such a result would mean that most (if not all) of the first (abortive) proceeding
was wasted effort and that the time-consuming process would have to be repeated. The disadvantages implicit in this possibility suggest that it is not advisable to deny reorganization courts at least some discretion to consider or refuse to consider releasing a debtor corporation from a Chapter X proceeding
and returning it to the old shareholder and management groups.
When the new proposal in this case was first announced, its advantage to
stockholders was clear. At the end of June 1946, when bidding for the debentures
was at 2I0,'4 it would have cost a stockholder about 50 per cent more to replace
The Commercial and Financial Chronicle
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(May 20, 1946). Messrs. Amott, Granger, and

Hillson are among the debenture-holders who opposed the modification.
,3158 F. 2d 838, 844 (C.C.A. 2d, 1946).
X4 xg Bank and Quotation Record, No. 7, at 67 (July 8, z946).
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his proportionate interest or equity in the corporation by purchasing debentures
on the open market than"by exercising his option to purchase under the modified plan.' s But at the end of August, when the debentures had dropped to 145,"6
this advantage had disappeared. And from-August 1946 to March 1947 the debeihtures dropped to i28' 7 and have since remained at about that figure.' s Since
the present decision, their price has approximately reflected the amount of cash
-principal and accrued interest-which debenture-holders will receive under
the proposal.9 It is possible that this decline was influenced by the stockholders' proposal and by the decision requiring that it be submitted to the
stockholders for consideration. Currently, three plans for paying the debentureholders, all providing for underwritten stock issues to which stockholders may
subscribe, are under consideration.20 The outcome of the decision so far as the
immediate parties are concerned is, therefore, that the debenture-holders, who
contracted merely for principal and interest on call or in 1952, will be prevented
from receiving, by virtue of the confirmed plan, a windfall of almost the entire
equity in the new corporation, when that equity had risen tremendously in
value as appraised by the market prices of the debentures and stock.2I

is Under the confirmed plan, the holder of one Sr,ooo debenture would get, for his claim of
$1,250 in principal and interest, ioo shares of new stock and income bonds convertible into 96

shares. A stockholder owning 196 shares, after selling his holdings at 3 (approximately the
average price of the stock in 1946), would have to spend $I,522 in addition to the proceeds of
the sale to purchase on the market a debenture, convertible into 196 shares, for $2,100. But if
he exercised his option under the modification, he would have to spend only $I,o58.4ofor 176.4
shares, at $6 per share. Thus the scheme's advantage to stockholders would disappear if the
debentures fell below about 163.
16ig Bank and Quotation Record, No. 8, at 67 (Aug. 1o, 1946).
'7 2o

Ibid., No. 4, at 67 (April 7, 1947)-

X82o Ibid., No. 8, at 67 (Aug. 11, 1947).

19As of November 1, 1946, the claims of the debenture-holders totalled $5,942,5oo, of which
and $S,x88,5oowas nterest. 158 F. 2d 838, 841 (C.C.A. 2d, 1946).
Thus interest amounted to one-fifth of the total claim.
2019
iMoody's Banks and Finance, No. 46, at 1754 (Aug. 20, 1947).
$4,754,000 was principal

2 The debentures reached a low of 91 in 1942. In 1944 they fluctuated between 221 and 53.
Moody's Manual of Investments, Banks-Insurance-Real Estate-Finance and Credit
Companies 26 (194.6). In May 1945, when the trustee's plan was filed, they rose to 8i. x8 Bank

and Quotation Record, No. 6, at 68 (June 7, 1945). By the end of 1945, after approval of the
trustee's plan, they had risen to 133. x9 Ibid., No. i, at 68 (Jan. 9, 1946). After the plan had

been accepted by creditors and stockholders they rose to 161. ig Ibid., No. 4, at 68 (April 6,
1946). In May, after confirmation, they rose as high as 215 bid. 9"Ibid., No. 6, at 68 (June 8,
x946). They sagged to 145 bid in August after proposal of the modification and taking of appeals from its denial. 19 Ibid., No. 9, at 68 (Sept. io, 1946). By March 1947, after the instant
decision, they had fallen to 128. 2o Ibid., No. 4, at 67 (April 7, 1947).
The debtors' stock was very active during July 1946 after proposal of the modification. On
July ii alone, zi8,ooo shares were traded, of the total of 862,098 shares. N.Y. Times, § 2, p.
26, col. 4 (July 12, 1946). On July 12, 100,200 shareswere traded. N.Y. Times, § 2, p. 20, col. 5
(July 13, 1946). On July 1, 1946 the stock opened at 2 . N.Y. Times, § 2, p. 32, col. 4 (July 2,
1946). On July 15 it opened at 41. N.Y. Times, § 2, p. 28, col. 4 (July 16, 1946).

